RSF-SPLM-N Assault Dilling; 14 Killed Including Children; US Pushes UNSC Ceasefire

The SAF maintains that RSF launched the war by attacking military installations and the Presidential Palace without provocation. RSF's pre-positioning of troops near Merowe in April 2023 and their refusal to stand down constituted the first act of aggression, and RSF fighters attacked SAF General Command before SAF responded.

The RSF claimed SAF forces attacked RSF positions first and that RSF acted in self-defense. Hemedti accused Burhan of ordering a pre-emptive strike, stating SAF forces fired on RSF locations in Khartoum before 9 AM. The RSF framed its own attacks as defensive responses to SAF aggression.

The US government formally declared in January 2025 that RSF and allied militias committed genocide against the Massalit and other non-Arab communities in Darfur. The UN Fact-Finding Mission found 'hallmarks of genocide' in El Fasher (Feb 2026). HRW documented systematic ethnic targeting of Massalit, Fur, and Zaghawa communities. RSF fighters reportedly stated intent to 'eliminate anything black from Darfur.'

The RSF has denied genocide allegations, claiming its operations targeted armed militias and terrorists rather than civilian populations. UAE, RSF's primary financial backer, denied that weapons and financing it provided were used for genocide. RSF leadership characterized their actions as counter-insurgency against non-Arab armed groups defending their communities.

UN Security Council sanctions monitors named the UAE in 2024 as involved in aiding the RSF with weapons and financing. Sudan's SAF government formally severed diplomatic relations with the UAE and expelled its ambassador. Independent researchers documented UAE-marked weapons in RSF-held areas. The RSF's Al Junaid corporation smuggles gold primarily to the UAE, which provides hard currency for weapons purchases.

The UAE denied providing weapons or financing to the RSF. Abu Dhabi called UN sanctions reports 'inaccurate' and rejected the accusations as politically motivated. UAE officials maintained they supported a negotiated peace process and humanitarian assistance to Sudan without taking sides. The UAE acknowledged business ties with RSF-affiliated gold mining operations but denied these constituted weapons financing.

Former US Special Envoy for Sudan Tom Perriello suggested as many as 400,000 people have died since April 2023. ACLED satellite modeling estimated more than 26,000 deaths from intentional injury in Khartoum alone between April 2023 and June 2024, with 61,000 total deaths—50% above prewar rates. Researchers note 90% of Khartoum deaths go unrecorded due to blackout conditions.

UN agencies directly documented approximately 27,000 deaths and 33,000 injuries since April 2023 as of late 2024. These figures reflect only verified, directly counted deaths. The UN acknowledged its figures are severe undercounts due to access restrictions, media blackouts, and collapse of health reporting systems across war zones.

The SAF and civilian transition parties agreed that RSF should be integrated into the Sudanese Armed Forces within 2 years under the 2022 Framework Agreement. Full integration was viewed as essential for Sudan's democratic transition. SAF leadership insisted on civilian control of the military and a unified chain of command as prerequisites for handing power to civilians.

The RSF demanded a 10-year timeline for integration, arguing that rapid absorption would destroy RSF's identity and leave its fighters vulnerable. Hemedti also demanded that RSF officers retain their ranks and that the RSF not be placed under army command until political transition was complete. The RSF saw a short timeline as an SAF power grab designed to eliminate a rival force.

The SAF maintained that airstrikes targeted legitimate military objectives—RSF command posts, weapons depots, and troop concentrations—even in urban areas. The SAF argued RSF's deliberate use of civilian neighborhoods and buildings as military bases created RSF responsibility for collateral civilian harm. SAF denied targeting civilian-only areas.

The UN Fact-Finding Mission concluded that SAF airstrikes in Khartoum, Omdurman, and other cities caused widespread civilian casualties and destruction of civilian infrastructure. Amnesty International documented SAF strikes on markets, hospitals, and residential areas with no discernible military purpose. HRW reported over 145 healthcare facilities hit by both sides, with evidence of SAF responsibility for several direct strikes.

The RSF repeatedly claimed to control the Presidential Palace, all three international airports, state media facilities, and most of Khartoum's residential areas from the opening hours of April 15, 2023. RSF communications boasted control of 80-90% of Khartoum within the first week. Hemedti stated the RSF had 'entered Khartoum' and seized its institutions.

The SAF disputed RSF claims of controlling key strategic sites. Satellite imagery and ACLED analysis confirmed RSF controlled most residential Khartoum by mid-2023 but that SAF retained control of its General Command headquarters, parts of Khartoum East, and several military installations. Full RSF control was never achieved even at the height of RSF dominance.

Human rights organizations and Darfur survivor communities maintain that the RSF was formally institutionalized from Janjaweed militias in 2013 under President Omar al-Bashir, making it a direct organizational successor. RSF fighters in West Darfur in 2023 referred to themselves as Arab militias and used the same ethnic targeting patterns as the 2003-era Janjaweed. Massalit survivors identified RSF commanders as former Janjaweed leaders.

RSF leadership argued the force was a reformed, professional institution distinct from informal Janjaweed militias. Hemedti, himself a former Janjaweed commander, claimed to have professionalized RSF into a conventional military force with command accountability. Supporters argued the RSF 2023 atrocities represented command failures rather than institutional continuation of genocide policy.

The UN Fact-Finding Mission explicitly concluded that the RSF used starvation as a method of warfare, constituting a war crime. Both RSF and SAF restricted humanitarian access: RSF blocked aid convoys, looted WFP supplies, and besieged populated cities including El Fasher. SAF restricted cross-border humanitarian operations into Darfur and denied access to RSF-held areas. The resulting famine in Zamzam camp (declared August 2024) was a foreseeable consequence.

The SAF government denied deliberately blocking aid, attributing access restrictions to legitimate security concerns and RSF interference with supply routes. SAF authorized cross-border aid to Darfur in late 2024 under international pressure but cited RSF use of humanitarian corridors for weapons smuggling as justification for controls. The SAF characterized RSF-held areas as beyond its security responsibility.

The UN and human rights organizations placed primary responsibility on the RSF for besieging El Fasher and deliberately targeting the civilian population. The RSF attacked IDP camps, humanitarian supply routes, and the Teaching Hospital. UN investigators warned repeatedly that RSF's siege would constitute crimes against humanity if continued. The RSF's stated intent to capture the city would, in UN experts' view, 'complete the genocide' in Darfur.

The RSF claimed its operations targeted SAF military positions within El Fasher and that civilians were harmed due to SAF's use of the city as a military stronghold. RSF accused SAF of deliberately sheltering behind civilian population. The RSF disputed IDP camp attack allegations, claiming it targeted armed groups operating from within camps.

The RSF and its foreign supporters argue the RSF-backed 'Government of Peace and Unity' declared in Nyala in February 2025 represents legitimate governance over Darfur and other RSF-held territories. The RSF charter declared secular democracy and decentralization, positioning the RSF as an anti-military progressive force. Some civic leaders in RSF areas signed the charter under unclear conditions.

The international community, African Union, and the vast majority of states refused to recognize the RSF's parallel government. The AU condemned the declaration as an unconstitutional act threatening Sudan's territorial integrity and sovereignty. The SAF's Port Sudan government retains international recognition. Critics noted that signatories to the RSF charter operated under RSF military occupation with no free civic space.

The SAF suspended Jeddah talks in August 2023 citing RSF bad faith: the RSF continued military operations during ceasefire periods, refused to withdraw from Khartoum residential areas, and used ceasefire discussions as cover to reposition forces. SAF argued the Jeddah process was unworkable because the RSF had no intention of accepting a political settlement that would subordinate it to civilian authority.

The RSF accused the SAF of demanding impossible preconditions for talks — including RSF withdrawal from all occupied positions — while continuing SAF airstrikes during negotiations. RSF representatives at Jeddah argued SAF never genuinely engaged with power-sharing arrangements. The RSF blamed US and Saudi mediators for favoring SAF positions and pressuring RSF while letting SAF off the hook.

The UN Fact-Finding Mission documented 400+ women who sought medical care for sexual violence between April 2023 and July 2024, acknowledging real numbers are 'far higher.' HRW documented systematic RSF sexual violence as a weapon of war in Darfur, Khartoum, and Gezira. Survivor testimonies describe mass rape during RSF attacks on neighborhoods. Doctors treating victims reported seeing patterns consistent with organized, military-ordered sexual violence.

The RSF denied using sexual violence as a systematic weapon of war, attributing reported incidents to actions by individual fighters acting outside orders. RSF leadership claimed to have disciplined fighters found guilty of sexual violence. RSF dismissed comprehensive documentation as politically motivated propaganda by pro-SAF or Western actors seeking to delegitimize RSF governance.

Gen. al-Burhan and Hemedti justified the October 2021 coup by citing what they described as political dysfunction and civilian government incompetence that endangered Sudan's stability. They claimed the military was protecting the revolution from rival civilian factions engaged in corruption and power struggles. Military officials argued a brief military stewardship was necessary to stabilize the transition before returning to democracy.

The Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), the UN, AU, US, and EU condemned the coup as an illegal seizure of power that betrayed Sudan's 2019 democratic revolution. Massive civilian protests (the 'marches of millions') demanded military withdrawal from politics. PM Hamdok, reinstated briefly under pressure, said the coup had 'created a political crisis that threatens the whole transition.' The coup's failure to deliver stability proved the critics correct.

UN sanctions monitors, Crisis Group, and independent researchers documented that the RSF's Al Junaid Multi-Activities Corporation controls gold mines generating an estimated $860 million annually in Darfur alone. Gold is predominantly smuggled to the UAE, providing RSF with hard currency for weapons, salaries, and operations. Gold revenues have financed RSF military campaigns throughout the war, enabling continued fighting despite international sanctions.

The RSF and UAE characterized Al Junaid's gold operations as legal commercial activities predating the war, arguing they do not constitute war financing. RSF denied that gold revenues specifically fund military operations, framing Al Junaid as a civilian economic enterprise distinct from the RSF's military command. The UAE denied that gold purchased from Al Junaid-affiliated sources constituted violation of any sanctions regime.

Analysis by Crisis Group and Sudan researchers characterized the October 2021 coup as a joint Burhan-Hemedti operation with both generals sharing power. Hemedti was publicly present alongside Burhan during the coup announcement and was part of the post-coup Sovereignty Council. Burhan held the nominal position of chairman, but Hemedti's RSF provided critical military muscle. The partnership of equals was always fragile given RSF-SAF institutional rivalry.

SAF-aligned accounts characterized the coup as primarily a military institution action led by Gen. Burhan as Sudan's senior military commander, with RSF as a subordinate partner. This framing positioned Hemedti as a junior partner whose subsequent insistence on RSF parity represented overreach. SAF narrative portrayed Hemedti's power claims as RSF expansion beyond its appropriate role.

UN experts concluded that Sudan's famine conditions, including those in Zamzam camp, resulted from deliberate actions by both parties: RSF siege of El Fasher cutting food supplies, RSF attacks on agricultural areas and water infrastructure, SAF restrictions on cross-line aid, and both sides looting humanitarian aid. The UN Fact-Finding Mission explicitly stated RSF used starvation as a method of warfare. The predictability of famine given documented access restrictions demonstrated intentionality.

SAF government representatives argued that famine was an unintended consequence of war disruption, compounded by pre-existing food insecurity and climate pressures. The SAF blamed RSF for creating famine conditions by occupying agricultural land and blocking aid routes in areas under RSF control. SAF pointed to its authorization of cross-border aid access in 2024 as evidence it did not deliberately pursue famine as a policy tool.

Multiple analysts and media reports cited Iranian-supplied drone technology — including Shahed-type loitering munitions — as significantly enhancing SAF strike capabilities during the 2024-2025 counteroffensive. SAF's ability to conduct sustained precision strikes on RSF positions in Omdurman and Khartoum reportedly reflected new Iranian drone systems, analogous to Iran's drone supply to Russia in Ukraine. The SAF counteroffensive gains coincided closely with reported delivery of Iranian hardware.

The SAF government did not publicly confirm receipt of Iranian military equipment, though it did not deny it either. Iran denied providing arms to the SAF. SAF officials attributed counteroffensive success to Sudanese military professionalism, local initiative, and improved tactics rather than foreign weapons. Some analysts cautioned that RSF overextension and supply problems, rather than specific weapons systems, drove SAF gains.

Sudanese civilian groups, led by the Forces of Freedom and Change and the Taqaddum coalition, maintain that a political settlement including civilian governance remains essential and possible. They point to the 2022 Framework Agreement as a viable blueprint. International mediators including the AU, US, and Saudi Arabia have consistently called for civilian inclusion in any peace process. Sudan's 2019 revolution demonstrated strong grassroots democratic aspiration.

Many Sudan analysts assess that both SAF and RSF are militarized institutions with no genuine interest in civilian oversight. With both sides pursuing military victory, the two-rival-government reality of 2025 suggests Sudan is drifting toward de facto partition rather than democratic transition. The displacement of 12 million people and destruction of state institutions makes civilian governance capacity extremely limited for the foreseeable future.

Survivors and human rights organizations reported widespread looting, sexual violence, and killings in Wad Madani during and after RSF capture in December 2023. Gezira State had been regarded as a safe area until RSF arrived; the fall was a massive shock. Radio Dabanga documented hundreds of cases of looting and extortion. Thousands fled immediately as RSF imposed 'taxes' and seized property.

RSF leadership claimed its forces entered Wad Madani in a disciplined military operation targeting SAF, portraying the city's population as welcoming RSF as a liberating force from an unpopular military government. The RSF denied systematic atrocities, attributing incidents to rogue fighters or criminal elements taking advantage of the transition of control.

The US State Department formally declared in January 2025 that RSF and allied militias committed genocide against the Massalit in Darfur. The UN Fact-Finding Mission found evidence establishing three underlying acts of genocide in Darfur, particularly in West Darfur and El Fasher. Genocide Watch issued a 'Genocide Emergency' for Sudan in January 2025. The pattern of systematic killing, ethnic targeting, and explicit statements by RSF fighters about exterminating non-Arab communities meets the Genocide Convention's standards.

The RSF denied genocide intent, the key legal element distinguishing genocide from ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity. Some international law scholars cautioned that proving 'specific intent to destroy' a group legally requires higher evidentiary standards than available. The ICC has not yet issued genocide charges in relation to the current conflict, and establishing genocide through international courts is a lengthy process.