Somalia: Tres Décadas de Conflicto Sin Estado Funcional

The 2022 SNA and Macawisley offensive achieved genuine military victories, clearing Al-Shabaab from over 100 villages in Hiiraan and central Somalia. The group suffered significant casualties and was forced into strategic retreat, losing revenue networks and popular support in liberated areas.

Al-Shabaab conducted a deliberate tactical withdrawal to avoid attrition in unfavorable terrain, preserving its core forces. The group subsequently retook several villages, demonstrating that SNA/Macawisley gains were fragile and that Al-Shabaab maintained the capacity to re-infiltrate 'liberated' areas within months.

The drawdown follows a carefully planned schedule linked to security benchmarks. Somalia's SNA has demonstrated growing capability, and the transition to Somali-led security is necessary for long-term sovereignty and sustainability. Continued foreign military presence creates dependency and undermines political legitimacy.

The SNA remains severely under-resourced, with training shortfalls, logistics gaps, and ghost-soldier problems. Multiple UNSOM reports warned that the drawdown timeline was too aggressive given Al-Shabaab's demonstrated ability to exploit vacuums. Several forward bases were handed over before SNA was capable of holding them.

Al-Shabaab controls no major towns and its territorial footprint has shrunk significantly. The group's 'control' is limited to rural shadow governance, road checkpoints, and nocturnal presence in areas officially administered by the government.

Al-Shabaab exercises effective shadow governance over large swaths of south and central Somalia, collecting taxes, adjudicating disputes, and enforcing rules in areas the FGS cannot access. ACLED estimates the group controls or influences approximately 20-40% of Somali territory depending on how 'control' is defined.

US airstrikes in Somalia are conducted under strict Rules of Engagement with significant Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) prior to any strike. AFRICOM assessments have found zero or minimal civilian casualties in the vast majority of strikes, and civilians are not intentionally targeted.

Independent monitors document credible evidence of civilian casualties in numerous US strikes that AFRICOM either denied or failed to investigate adequately. Airwars has documented dozens of incidents with credible civilian harm reports. Local communities report strikes hitting civilian gatherings, farms, and vehicles.

Al-Shabaab generates approximately $100 million annually, primarily through extortion of businesses, taxation of internal trade, and charcoal smuggling. Revenue has declined as the group lost territorial control and international action against charcoal exports was strengthened.

Al-Shabaab's revenue is more likely in the range of $150-180 million annually, making it one of the wealthiest terrorist organizations globally. The group has diversified into telecommunications taxation, real estate, and agricultural production in areas under its shadow governance.

Al-Shabaab's deliberate restrictions on aid agencies—including the 2011 ban on foreign aid organizations in areas under its control—are the primary cause of humanitarian access gaps. The group uses food insecurity as a weapon of war and taxes humanitarian shipments it allows through.

While Al-Shabaab restrictions are real, government military operations and bureaucratic impediments also limit humanitarian access. Airstrikes in food-insecure areas, movement restrictions imposed by SNA, and bureaucratic delays in government-controlled areas all compound the access crisis.

The Macawisley mobilization is a genuine community uprising against Al-Shabaab's repression. Clan militias are motivated by Al-Shabaab's forced taxation, assassinations of elders, forcible recruitment of children, and destruction of livelihoods. They represent the most authentic Somali resistance to the insurgency.

Macawisley motivation is mixed: genuine grievance, clan land disputes, economic opportunism, and political manipulation by clan elites. The militias risk inter-clan conflict when coordinated poorly, and some join the offensive primarily to settle clan scores or capture territory rather than ideologically oppose Al-Shabaab.

Somaliland was an independent state (British Somaliland) for four days in June 1960 before voluntarily joining Italian Somalia. The union failed and was abrogated by Mogadishu's repression—including the 1988 massacre of Hargeisa civilians. Somaliland has governed itself since 1991, held multiple presidential elections with peaceful transitions, and maintains its own currency, military, and judiciary. Israel formally recognized Somaliland on December 26, 2025—the first UN-member state recognition—a watershed in its three-decade independence bid.

Somaliland is an integral part of the Federal Republic of Somalia under international law and Somalia's 2012 constitution. The AU's territorial integrity principle—not uti possidetis—governs African border disputes. The FGS called Ethiopia's January 2024 MOU granting sea access through Berbera an 'act of aggression,' severed diplomatic ties with Addis Ababa, and secured Arab League support for Somalia's position. Israel's recognition is an outlier driven by geopolitical calculation, not legitimacy.

Piracy resurged after six near-zero years due to multiple converging factors: compliance with Best Management Practices (BMP) slipped and vessels dropped armed guards as the threat faded; Red Sea Houthi attacks diverted naval assets; economic desperation from COVID and drought. CTF-151 documented 49 piracy-related incidents since November 2023. At the peak (January 2011), pirates held 736 hostages and 32 ships simultaneously. The Al-Shabaab–Houthi nexus (UN-documented) also adds an organized state-sponsorship dimension not present in the 2008-2012 era.

Piracy is a response to foreign illegal fishing (IUU fishing) that has devastated Somali fish stocks for decades. Without international legal mechanisms to protect their marine resources, coastal communities turn to what they call 'coast guarding.' Criminalizing pirates without addressing illegal fishing misses structural root causes of the problem.

Turkey has been Somalia's most consistent bilateral partner since President Erdogan's landmark 2011 Mogadishu visit during the famine—the first non-African leader to visit. Turkey manages Mogadishu port (Albayrak company) and airport, operates Camp Turksom (largest overseas Turkish military base, training ~1,500 soldiers simultaneously), and has built lasting goodwill. Turkey-Somalia ties are institutionalized and bipartisan in Ankara.

Turkey's control of both Mogadishu's port and airport under long-term contracts by Albayrak creates structural economic dependency. Turkish-trained SNA units sometimes act as loyalty forces for specific politicians. The UAE-Turkey rivalry in Somalia is acute: UAE's 2018 fallout with FGS (after FGS confiscated a UAE plane allegedly carrying $9.6M in cash) accelerated UAE investment in sub-national actors (Puntland, Somaliland via DP World Berbera), creating a fragmentation dynamic.

The FGS has implemented biometric registration and payroll reform programs that have significantly reduced ghost soldiers on the SNA rolls. The military's capacity has genuinely grown through ATMIS training programs and the integration of clan militia fighters.

Ghost soldiers remain a severe problem: multiple UN and donor assessments estimate 30-50% of registered SNA soldiers may be non-existent, with pay diverted by commanders. The true combat-ready strength is a fraction of the official figure of ~24,000, severely undermining confidence in security transition plans.

Al-Shabaab's ban on major humanitarian organizations operating in its territory in 2011 directly caused mass preventable starvation. The group prioritized ideological control over civilian welfare, blocking food aid during the worst drought in 60 years. Al-Shabaab bears primary moral and legal responsibility.

Responsibility is shared: the international community was slow to respond and had previously stopped funding programs in Al-Shabaab areas due to counter-terrorism laws (US material support provisions effectively blocked aid). The TFG's territorial fragmentation also hampered response. Al-Shabaab was decisive but not the only factor.

Kenya's KDF forces are the backbone of security in Jubbaland. Kenya has invested heavily in Kismayo port operations and the Jubbaland state administration represents a buffer against Al-Shabaab threatening Kenya's border. Kenya's engagement is essential and its interests are broadly aligned with regional stability.

Kenya has effectively supported a Jubbaland political structure that acts as a semi-autonomous state resistant to FGS authority, serving Kenyan interests over Somali national unity. Ethiopia has competing commercial interests in southern Somalia and the two regional powers sometimes work at cross-purposes, fragmenting Somali governance.

All evidence points to Al-Shabaab as responsible for the deadliest attack in Somali history. The group had the motive, capability, and history of VBIED attacks in Mogadishu. The fact that Al-Shabaab did not immediately claim responsibility reflected a PR calculation, not innocent denial.

Al-Shabaab initially did not claim responsibility and some analysts noted the unusual scale of the attack—using military-grade explosives—raised questions about whether state-level actors may have been involved. The group's silence was interpreted by some as distancing from an operation that killed many ordinary Muslims.

Somalia faces the most severe drought conditions in 40 years due to climate change. Five consecutive failed rainy seasons (2020-2022) represent an unprecedented climate event that would have caused crisis even without conflict. Climate change is the foundational threat to food security in the Horn of Africa.

While drought is severe, Somalia's food insecurity is persistently worst in areas of active conflict and Al-Shabaab control. OCHA data consistently shows that access restrictions, displacement from fighting, and destruction of livelihoods compound climate stress. Conflict is the multiplying factor that turns drought into famine.

The SNA has made measurable progress: ATMIS has trained tens of thousands of soldiers, Turkey operates a major training facility, and the SNA demonstrated offensive capability in the 2022 Hiiraan offensive. Clan militia integration and the National Consultative Council have improved civil-military coordination.

Security sector reform has fallen far short of benchmarks set under the Security Pact. The SNA remains clan-divided, under-resourced, poorly paid, and dependent on external logistics. Multiple evaluations show SNA units cannot independently sustain operations without foreign airlift, intelligence, and maintenance support.

UNSC Resolution 2036 (2012) banned charcoal imports from Somalia and Resolution 2060 extended enforcement. Combined with EUNAVFOR interdiction of shipments, the ban has reduced Al-Shabaab's charcoal revenue and applied meaningful financial pressure on the group's operations.

The charcoal ban has been poorly enforced, with UN Monitoring Group reports documenting continued large-scale exports through intermediaries in Gulf states. The ban imposes economic costs on Somali charcoal producers and communities without effectively denying Al-Shabaab its revenue.

ISIS-Somalia (ISIL affiliate in Puntland) represents a growing threat distinct from Al-Shabaab. The group has claimed attacks including a 2019 assault on a Puntland military camp. ISIS's ideology attracts disaffected Al-Shabaab fighters and threatens to fragment the insurgency into a more complex multi-actor conflict.

ISIS-Somalia remains a small, localized threat confined mainly to Puntland's Bari mountains. Al-Shabaab has actively suppressed ISIS presence in Somalia, viewing the group as a rival. ISIS-Somalia's limited manpower and territorial base means it remains a secondary concern compared to Al-Shabaab's national-scale insurgency.

Diaspora remittances, estimated at $1.4-2 billion annually, dwarf official development assistance and are more reliable, directly reaching households. Remittances represent Somalia's largest source of foreign exchange and a critical economic lifeline. Policy should focus on reducing transfer costs and protecting money transfer operators.

While remittances are crucial, they cannot substitute for state investment in infrastructure, health, and education. International aid builds public goods that remittances, distributed to individual households, cannot. Somalia's development deficit requires sustained ODA alongside remittance flows.

The March 2026 constitutional amendments — passed by parliament and signed by the president on March 8 — represent the completion of a 12-year constitutional review process. The changes introduce a presidential system with direct elections, replacing the indirect clan-based selection process that has been repeatedly delayed. The amendments provide Somalia with a proper constitutional foundation for the 2026 elections and long-term democratic governance.

The constitutional vote was taken by a boycotted parliament in which quorum was disputed, travel restrictions were imposed on opposition MPs, and federal member states were not consulted. Southwest State, Puntland, and Jubbaland all rejected the process as unconstitutional. The JSP party's own secretary general resigned calling it a 'one-man show.' Critics argue the amendments were rushed through to extend term limits and consolidate power ahead of elections, not to advance democracy.

The MOU granting Ethiopia sea access through Somaliland is a legitimate bilateral agreement between sovereign states. It provides Ethiopia essential economic access to the sea—denied since Eritrea's independence in 1993—and offers Somaliland meaningful international recognition and investment in exchange. It is in the interest of all parties.

The MOU violates Somalia's territorial sovereignty and the AU's cardinal principle against recognizing breakaway regions. Ethiopia's deal with Somaliland implicitly recognizes its independence and sets a dangerous precedent for other African secessionist movements. The FGS rejected the MOU and it risks military escalation in the Horn.