Myanmar: La Junta Militar Pierde Terreno ante la Resistencia Armada

Civiles Muertos (AAPP) 6,486+ β–²
Personas Desplazadas Internamente 3.6 million β–²
Presos PolΓ­ticos 22,668 β–²
Control Territorial del SAC ~20% β–Ό
DΓ­as Desde el Golpe 1,873
Ataques AΓ©reos Documentados (2025) 2,602 β–²
Municipios Bajo Control de la Resistencia 250+ β–²
LATESTMar 29, 2026 Β· 6 events
03

Military Operations

Jan 5–Dec 24
  • β—Ž
    Pazigyi Village Inauguration Bombing
    Apr 11, 2023 β€” SAC jet fighters and helicopter gunship bombed Pazigyi village, Kanbalu Township, Sagaing Region during a public ceremony. 170+ killed, including women and children. UN Special Rapporteur called it 'an act of pure terror.'
    Apr 11, 2023T1
  • β—Ž
    Depayin Charity Concert Bombing
    Oct 23, 2022 β€” SAC jets bombed a charity concert and fundraiser in Kanbalu Township, Sagaing Region, killing 80+ people. Hundreds wounded. One of the deadliest single attacks of the conflict.
    Oct 23, 2022T2
  • β—Ž
    Let Yet Kone IDP School Airstrike
    Apr 11, 2022 β€” SAC jets struck a school hosting IDPs in Let Yet Kone village, Sagaing Region, killing 60+ civilians. Village was hosting displaced persons fleeing SAC ground operations.
    Apr 11, 2022T2
  • β—Ž
    Hpruso Christmas Eve Massacre
    Dec 24, 2021 β€” SAC troops killed 35+ civilians, burning them alive in vehicles in Hpruso Township, Kayah State. Victims were Christians fleeing violence. HRW documented as a war crime.
    Dec 24, 2021T2
  • ✦
    Bago Massacre β€” Protest Crackdown
    Apr 9, 2021 β€” SAC security forces opened fire on anti-coup protesters in Bago, killing 80+ people. Considered one of the bloodiest single-day crackdowns of the protest era. Heavy weapons including machine guns used against civilians.
    Apr 9, 2021T2
  • β—Ž
    Sagaing Region Village Burning Campaign
    2022–2023 β€” SAC forces systematically burned 800+ villages in Sagaing Region as counter-insurgency strategy. Villages were torched during ground operations, with civilian residents often present. One of the largest documented scorched-earth campaigns in modern Southeast Asian history.
    Jan 2022–Dec 2023T3
  • β—Ž
    Northeastern Regional Military Command β€” Lashio
    Aug 2024 β€” MNDAA/TNLA captured the Northeastern Regional Military Command headquarters in Lashio, Northern Shan State. First Regional Military Command HQ captured by resistance forces. Hundreds of SAC soldiers surrendered or fled.
    Aug 3, 2024T2
  • β—Ž
    Western Regional Military Command β€” Ann
    Dec 20, 2024 β€” AA captured Ann Township's Western Regional Military Command headquarters, the second Regional Military Command lost to resistance forces. Complete collapse of SAC military authority in Rakhine State.
    Dec 20, 2024T2
  • β—Ž
    Kokang Self-Administered Zone β€” Laukkai
    Jan 5, 2024 β€” MNDAA captured Laukkai, the capital of the Kokang Self-Administered Zone. Thousands of online scam compound victims freed. SAC lost control of the entire Kokang border region.
    Jan 5, 2024T2
  • β—Ž
    Kachin State Airstrikes on Civilian Sites
    2021–2025 β€” SAC conducted repeated airstrikes on villages, churches, and market areas in Kachin State. Multiple documented strikes on IDP camps. Thousands of Kachin civilians killed or displaced by aerial bombardment combined with ground operations.
    2021–2025T3
04

Humanitarian Impact

Casualty figures by category with source tiers and contested status
CategoryKilledInjuredSourceTierStatusNote
People Killed by Junta (AAPP) 7,941+ Unknown AAPP (Mar 23, 2026) Institutional Contested AAPP documents individually verified deaths since the Feb 2021 coup. Actual toll significantly higher β€” excludes many undocumented deaths in remote areas, detention deaths, and indirect conflict casualties.
Total Conflict Deaths (ACLED, all actors) 96,000+ Unknown ACLED (early 2026 estimate) Institutional Contested ACLED estimate includes combatant deaths from all sides (SAC, PDF, EAOs) plus civilians. Junta denies figures. Likely an undercount given limited reporting from remote conflict zones. Significant increase from 50,000+ estimate in 2025 reflects escalating combat losses.
Deaths in Detention / Torture 2,000+ Unknown AAPP (Dec 2025) Institutional Contested AAPP documents deaths in SAC detention from torture, medical neglect, and extrajudicial execution. Junta denies systematic mistreatment. Many families never notified.
Children Killed 751+ Unknown AAPP (Apr 2025) Institutional Contested AAPP documents 751 confirmed child deaths. UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) warns actual number is much higher given attacks on schools, villages, and IDP camps.
Women Killed 1,494+ Unknown AAPP (Apr 2025) Institutional Contested AAPP documented 1,494 confirmed female deaths. Women Make Peace and other organizations document gender-based violence including rape as a weapon of war by SAC forces.
Airstrike Civilian Deaths (2025) 1,971 Unknown ACLED (2025 annual data) Institutional Contested ACLED recorded 2,602 air attacks in 2025 β€” the highest annual total since the coup β€” killing 1,971 people. SAC denies targeting civilians.
Earthquake Deaths (Mar 28, 2025) 3,500–5,352 Thousands SAC Official (3,564–3,770) / Independent Media (DVB: 4,549 / Mizzima: 5,352+) All tiers Heavily Contested Junta official figures significantly lower than independent media reports. True toll likely higher due to access restrictions in conflict-affected earthquake zones. 7.7-magnitude earthquake struck Mandalay-Sagaing region on March 28, 2025.
SAC Soldiers Killed (Resistance Claims) 50,000+ Unknown NUG Defense Ministry / EAO Claims Unverified Heavily Contested NUG/PDF/EAO claims of SAC soldier deaths. Junta does not publish military casualty figures. Independent verification is impossible. Claims likely exaggerated for propaganda; actual SAC losses significant given territory losses.
Killed in 2021 Protest Crackdowns 800+ 3,000+ AAPP (2021) Institutional Contested Security forces fired on anti-coup protesters from February to April 2021. Deadliest single day: March 3 (38+ killed). Bago crackdown April 9 killed 80+. Junta characterizes all deaths as 'instigated' by armed groups.
IDP/Displacement-Related Deaths Unknown (thousands estimated) Unknown UN OCHA / UNHCR (2025) Official Evolving 3.6 million IDPs (Nov 2025) with only 15% in formal camps; majority in jungles/temporary shelters with minimal healthcare, food, or sanitation. Mortality rate in IDP camps not systematically tracked but known to be significant.
05

Economic & Market Impact

GDP Growth Rate β–Ό From +3% pre-coup to -18% in 2021
-18% (2021)
Source: World Bank / IMF (2022–2025 estimates)
Kyat vs USD (Black Market) β–Ό From ~1,300 pre-coup (2021) to 5,500+ (2025)
~5,500+ kyat/USD
Source: Irrawaddy / Myanmar Now economic monitoring (2025)
Inflation Rate β–Ό Peaked above 30% in 2022; persistent double-digit inflation since coup
~26%
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook / Crisis Group (2024–2025)
Foreign Direct Investment β–Ό Down from $5.6B pre-coup peak (2019); collapsed 85%+
~$850M (2024)
Source: DICA (Myanmar Investment Commission) / World Bank (2024)
Poverty Rate (Below $2.15/day) β–Ό From 25% pre-coup to near 50% by 2024; over 15 million newly poor
~49%
Source: World Bank / UNDP Myanmar Poverty Assessment (2024)
Border Trade (Myanmar-China) β–Ό Muse-Mandalay route disrupted by Op 1027; billions in trade lost 2023–2024
Severely disrupted
Source: RFA / Irrawaddy economic reporting (2024–2025)
Junta Military Spending β–² Increased since coup despite economic collapse; estimated 30%+ of budget
~$3B+ annually
Source: Crisis Group / SAC budget estimates (2024–2025)
Banking System Health β–Ό CDM shut government banks in 2021; ATM cash limits; interbank transfers disrupted; informal hawala dominant
Near collapse
Source: IMF / Myanmar Now / DVB economic reporting (2022–2025)
06

Contested Claims Matrix

15 claims · click to expand
Was the February 2021 coup legally justified?
Source A: SAC / Military Junta
The coup was a constitutional necessity under Article 417 of the 2008 military-drafted constitution. The November 2020 elections were fraudulent β€” 10.4 million votes were irregularly cast β€” and the civilian government failed to act. The military acted to preserve national sovereignty and order.
Source B: NUG / International Community
The coup was illegal and unconstitutional. The November 2020 elections were verified as free and fair by international observers. The Myanmar Election Commission found no evidence of significant fraud. The coup was a naked power grab by Min Aung Hlaing to avoid accountability and extend military privilege.
⚖ RESOLUTION: No electoral fraud was substantiated by independent observers. The UN, US, EU, and ASEAN majority rejected junta legitimacy. Myanmar's Supreme Court and legal scholars found the coup had no constitutional basis. The NUG, CRPH, and most of the international community recognize the junta as illegitimate.
How many civilians has the junta killed since the 2021 coup?
Source A: SAC / Junta
Military operations target terrorists and armed insurrectionists, not civilians. All casualties reported are combatants affiliated with illegal armed organizations. Civilian deaths are minimized as collateral damage in legitimate counter-terrorism operations.
Source B: AAPP / UN / Human Rights Organizations
AAPP has documented 6,486+ confirmed civilian deaths as of April 2025, with 29,507 arrests. ACLED estimates 50,000+ total conflict deaths including combatants. UNHCR and UN OHCHR have documented systematic attacks on civilian villages, hospitals, schools, churches, and markets as deliberate targeting.
⚖ RESOLUTION: AAPP, ACLED, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and UN Special Rapporteur all document systematic civilian targeting. The Pazigyi airstrike (170+ dead at a public ceremony), Depayin concert bombing (80+ dead), and Let Yet Kone IDP camp strike (60+ dead) indicate deliberate attacks on non-combatants. UN has called for ICC referral.
How much territory does the junta actually control?
Source A: SAC / Junta
The military controls all major cities, strategic highways, ports, and economic zones. Rural insecurity does not equate to resistance governance. The SAC maintains administrative presence in all 14 states and regions through civilian administrators and local governance structures.
Source B: NUG / Resistance Analysis
By mid-2024, the SAC controls fewer than 100 of 330+ townships. Resistance forces (PDF, EAOs) control or contest the majority of Myanmar's territory by area. Rakhine State is 90% under AA control, Shan State has been largely captured, and Sagaing/Magway are PDF-dominated. Only Yangon, Naypyidaw, and Mandalay remain firmly under junta control.
⚖ RESOLUTION: Independent analysts (Crisis Group, SAC-M, ACLED) estimate junta territory at 20-33% of the country. The NUG Defense Ministry claims junta controls under 100 townships. Territory is highly dynamic and contested; the junta retains major urban centers and border economic zones.
Is China supporting the Myanmar military junta?
Source A: SAC / China's Position
China maintains a policy of non-interference and engages with whoever controls Myanmar's government. China's trade and investment relations with Myanmar predate the coup. China has brokered ceasefires and encouraged dialogue. Any military equipment transfers are normal commercial relations.
Source B: NUG / Western Analysts
China has supplied the SAC with armed drones, jet aircraft components, and other military equipment. China's border trade provides critical revenue to the junta. China has blocked or watered down UN Security Council resolutions on Myanmar. Chinese-brokered ceasefires have only benefited the SAC by halting resistance gains.
⚖ RESOLUTION: China has provided diplomatic cover, military equipment (aircraft, drones), and economic revenue to the SAC. China's primary interest is border stability, protection of its economic investments (BRI projects, pipelines, Kyaukpyu port), and suppression of online scam compounds on the border. China's stance has shifted toward greater junta support from 2024-2025 as resistance gains threatened Chinese-linked projects.
Is the current civil war linked to the 2017 Rohingya genocide?
Source A: SAC / Junta
The 2017 operations in Rakhine State were legitimate counter-terrorism operations against ARSA militants. There is no genocide. The current conflict is entirely separate β€” caused by NUG-sponsored terrorism against a legitimate government. Rohingya who fled voluntarily can return.
Source B: UN / Rohingya Advocates
The 2017 military campaign constitutes genocide under international law (ICJ provisional ruling). The same military institutions and commanders who conducted the 2017 genocide now rule Myanmar. The civil war exposes the same impunity structure that enabled genocide. AA's takeover of Rakhine also raises new concerns about Rohingya safety.
⚖ RESOLUTION: The International Court of Justice issued provisional measures in 2020 recognizing the plausibility of genocide against Rohingya. The UN Fact-Finding Mission found 'genocidal intent.' The same Tatmadaw leadership responsible for 2017 atrocities now runs the SAC. The AA's capture of Rakhine has created new humanitarian concerns for the 600,000+ Rohingya who remained in Myanmar.
Did China encourage or greenlight Operation 1027?
Source A: SAC / Skeptics
The Three Brotherhood Alliance acted independently to pursue territorial and economic gains. China did not authorize Operation 1027 and was caught off-guard by its scope. China's immediate priority was halting operations to protect border trade and Chinese nationals in the area.
Source B: NUG / Analysts
China had long relationships with MNDAA and TNLA as historically China-aligned EAOs. China's focus on eliminating border scam compounds provided a pretext that aligned with the alliance's goals. China's rapid brokering of a ceasefire β€” only when resistance gains threatened Chinese-linked infrastructure β€” suggests awareness if not tacit approval.
⚖ RESOLUTION: No confirmed evidence of Chinese pre-authorization. However, MNDAA and TNLA had traditional ties to China, and Operation 1027 began partly motivated by anti-scam compound operations that China supported. China's rapid ceasefire mediation showed it could influence resistance EAOs. Most analysts conclude China was informed rather than directive.
Can the NUG realistically govern Myanmar if the junta falls?
Source A: NUG
The NUG has established 17 ministries, a working judiciary, civil administration in liberated areas, and coordination with 20+ EAOs. The Federal Democracy Charter provides a framework for a federal democratic system. The NUG maintains international recognition from key democracies and has significant diaspora support and financial capacity.
Source B: Skeptics / Regional Analysts
The NUG operates primarily in exile and has limited physical presence inside Myanmar. EAOs have their own competing governance structures, territorial ambitions, and political agendas that may not align with NUG authority. Post-conflict governance will require complex federal negotiations between dozens of ethnic armed organizations.
⚖ RESOLUTION: The NUG has demonstrated administrative capacity in KNU-controlled zones and some PDF-liberated areas. However, significant challenges remain: EAO coordination is imperfect, the NUG lacks unified military command, and international recognition remains limited. Post-conflict governance will require genuine power-sharing federalism with ethnic minorities.
How is the Arakan Army treating the Rohingya population in Rakhine?
Source A: AA / ULA
The AA is committed to protecting all communities in Rakhine State, including Muslims. The ULA has established local governance frameworks and opposes discrimination. The AA has released statements condemning ethnic persecution and invited Rohingya to participate in Rakhine's future governance structures.
Source B: Rohingya Advocates / Human Rights Groups
Rohingya communities report displacement, restrictions on movement, and mistreatment by AA forces in areas they capture. AA has historically operated in predominantly Buddhist Rakhine regions. The 600,000+ Rohingya remaining in Myanmar face a new, uncertain power dynamic with an armed force that has historically excluded them.
⚖ RESOLUTION: The situation is evolving and contested. AA leadership has made conciliatory statements, but independent verification of Rohingya treatment in AA-controlled areas is limited. Human rights organizations have documented some concerning incidents. Rohingya in Bangladesh refugee camps (900,000+) are watching with deep uncertainty about prospects for safe return.
Will the junta's conscription law restore military capability?
Source A: SAC / Junta
The People's Military Service Law is a necessary measure to restore national defense capacity. Mandatory service is practiced in many democratic nations. The 14 million eligible youth will provide the manpower needed to restore security and defend Myanmar against foreign-backed terrorists.
Source B: NUG / Analysts
Conscription will deepen resistance by forcing civilians to fight for a hated regime. Conscripts have low morale, high desertion rates, and many defect to the resistance. The law is creating a youth exodus to Thailand, India, and China rather than military recruits. By 2025, many conscripts reportedly surrendered to resistance forces immediately.
⚖ RESOLUTION: Evidence from 14 batches of conscripts by 2025 shows mixed results. Some conscripts have bolstered junta numbers, but defection rates are high and resistance forces have actively recruited from surrendered conscripts. The law has accelerated youth migration out of Myanmar and deepened popular hostility toward the junta.
What was the true death toll from the March 2025 earthquake?
Source A: SAC / Junta
The official death toll from the March 28, 2025 earthquake was 3,564–3,770 as reported by junta-controlled media. The SAC coordinated effective rescue operations and accepted international humanitarian assistance in a timely manner.
Source B: Independent Media / Aid Organizations
Independent media (DVB: 4,549 deaths; Mizzima: 5,352+ deaths) report significantly higher tolls than junta figures. Access restrictions prevented accurate counting. The earthquake struck war-devastated communities with destroyed infrastructure, compromising rescue. SAC maintained military operations even in earthquake zones, hampering aid delivery.
⚖ RESOLUTION: The true death toll is likely significantly higher than official SAC figures, given systematic underreporting, restricted access to conflict zones, and the devastation in already-destroyed Sagaing Region. International aid organizations were unable to independently verify casualty figures due to access restrictions.
Were the December 2025 junta-organized elections legitimate?
Source A: SAC / Junta
Myanmar held successful general elections providing a democratic mandate for the new government. The elections were open to all legal political parties and conducted under established electoral law. The results reflect the genuine choice of Myanmar citizens who reject terrorism and support stability.
Source B: NUG / International Community
The elections were held without the NLD (banned), imprisoned Aung San Suu Kyi, or participation from most ethnic parties. Elections could not be held in vast conflict-affected areas covering most of the country. The 2008 constitution guarantees 25% of parliamentary seats to military appointees regardless of results. ASEAN, US, EU, and UN all rejected the elections as illegitimate.
⚖ RESOLUTION: The elections lacked basic democratic prerequisites: free participation, independent monitoring, and meaningful civil liberties. The military's constitutional veto power and the exclusion of the country's most popular party (NLD) made the results non-representative. No major democracy recognized the outcome as legitimate.
Is the resistance unified under NUG command?
Source A: NUG
The NUG has signed cooperation agreements with major EAOs and PDF units. A Joint Command and Coordination Council coordinates military strategy. The Federal Political Negotiation and Consultation Committee provides political coordination. The resistance increasingly operates with shared strategic objectives against the SAC.
Source B: SAC / Skeptical Analysts
The resistance is deeply fragmented β€” over 20 EAOs with competing interests, territorial ambitions, and differing visions for Myanmar's political future. Some groups like RCSS/SSA signed ceasefires with the SAC. KNU-affiliated BGFK supported the SAC in Myawaddy. Coordination is inconsistent and resistance forces operate largely independently.
⚖ RESOLUTION: The resistance is more coordinated than in 2021 but remains pluralistic rather than unified. Operation 1027 demonstrated effective Three Brotherhood Alliance coordination, and the NUG has formalized relationships with most major EAOs. However, full military unification has not been achieved, and EAOs retain independent command structures and political agendas.
Is the junta deliberately targeting civilians in airstrikes?
Source A: SAC / Junta
All air operations target verified terrorist positions and military infrastructure. Any civilian casualties result from terrorists using civilian shields and infrastructure. The military follows international humanitarian law and takes all precautions to minimize civilian harm in counter-terrorism operations.
Source B: UN / Human Rights Organizations
ACLED recorded 2,602 air attacks in 2025 alone β€” the highest rate since the coup. Multiple strikes have hit hospitals, churches, schools, markets, and IDP camps with no military presence. The Pazigyi, Depayin, Let Yet Kone, and Hpruso incidents are among dozens demonstrating deliberate civilian targeting. The UN Special Rapporteur has called for ICC referral for crimes against humanity.
⚖ RESOLUTION: Multiple independent investigations by HRW, Amnesty International, the UN Special Rapporteur, and ACLED data confirm a systematic pattern of attacks on civilian infrastructure. The geographic pattern (villages, markets, religious sites, IDP camps) and frequency of civilian strikes far exceeds what could be explained by incidental error, indicating deliberate targeting policy.
Is the junta blocking humanitarian aid access?
Source A: SAC / Junta
The SAC permits humanitarian organizations to operate in government-controlled areas and has established aid distribution through government channels. Unauthorized movement into terrorist-controlled areas is a security issue, not a humanitarian restriction. The SAC has coordinated international earthquake relief following the March 2025 disaster.
Source B: UN OCHA / INGOs / NUG
UN OCHA's 2025 Humanitarian Response Plan was only 7.8% funded, with access severely restricted in conflict areas. The SAC imposes movement restrictions, requires bureaucratic approvals, and has arrested aid workers. 3.6 million IDPs (Nov 2025) have severely inadequate access to food, medicine, and shelter. The earthquake exacerbated an already dire access crisis.
⚖ RESOLUTION: UN OCHA, ICRC, and multiple INGOs have documented systematic access restrictions to conflict-affected areas. The 2025 humanitarian plan's 7.8% funding rate reflects both donor shortfalls and operational impossibility in junta-restricted zones. UN calls Myanmar one of the world's most severe humanitarian crises with correspondingly limited access.
Can Myanmar achieve lasting peace through a federal democratic framework?
Source A: NUG / EAO Coalition
The Federal Democracy Charter, agreed by the NUG and major EAOs, provides a viable framework for a federal union respecting ethnic minority rights. With the SAC defeated, a negotiated federal transition is achievable. Myanmar's diverse ethnic communities have shown willingness to cooperate within a federal structure through their anti-junta coalition.
Source B: Regional Skeptics / Some Ethnic Groups
Myanmar has never functioned as a genuine federal democracy. Decades of ethnic armed conflict predate the 2021 coup and reflect deep disputes over land, resources, and autonomy that a single political framework cannot resolve. Some EAOs (like the AA) effectively seek near-independence rather than federal integration, potentially fragmenting the country.
⚖ RESOLUTION: The path to a stable federal Myanmar remains uncertain. The unprecedented anti-junta coalition has demonstrated cross-ethnic solidarity, but post-conflict governance negotiations will be highly complex. Historical precedents from comparable federal transitions suggest it will require sustained international support, inclusive negotiations, and genuine power-sharing arrangements that go beyond existing frameworks.
07

Political & Diplomatic

M
Min Aung Hlaing
Senior General; SAC Chairman (2021–Jul 2025); now Chairman, State Security & Peace Commission
junta
The military must safeguard the nation's existence. We will work for the country and the people, and hand over power to the winning party after holding a free and fair election.
S
Soe Win
Vice-Senior General; SAC Vice Chairman; now Vice Chairman, State Security & Peace Commission
junta
The military will not allow the country to fall into the hands of terrorists and anarchists who seek to destroy the union.
T
Myat Tun Oo
SAC Information Committee Chairman; regime spokesperson; controlled state media propaganda
junta
All military operations target terrorists β€” not civilians. The claims of human rights organizations are fabrications designed to destabilize Myanmar.
D
Duwa Lashi La
NUG Acting President; former Kachin State lawyer and community leader
nug
The SAC junta's brutality will never break the people's will. We will establish a federal democratic union where all citizens have equal rights regardless of ethnicity or religion.
W
Mahn Win Khaing Than
NUG Prime Minister; former Lower House Speaker; ethnic Karen NLD leader
nug
This is our darkest moment, but the dawn will come. The people of Myanmar have chosen democracy and will sacrifice everything to achieve it.
A
Aung San Suu Kyi
Imprisoned State Counsellor; Nobel Peace Laureate; sentenced to 27 years by junta courts
nug
Please take care of yourselves. Do not be reckless. Do not be controlled by fear of the military.
Z
Zin Mar Aung
NUG Minister for Foreign Affairs; political prisoner under previous junta; international spokesperson
nug
We call on the international community to recognize the NUG as Myanmar's legitimate government and to provide concrete support β€” not just statements β€” to the people's struggle for democracy.
T
Twan Mrat Naing (Aung Myo Kyaw)
Major General; AA Commander-in-Chief; ULA (AA political wing) Chairman; de facto ruler of Rakhine
eao
The Arakan Army fights not only to liberate Rakhine but to build a truly federal democratic Myanmar where all peoples can live in dignity and equality.
M
Mutu Say Poe
KNU (Karen National Union) Chairman; longest-serving ethnic armed organization leader in Myanmar
eao
The Karen people have been fighting for our rights for 70 years. Now we stand with all the peoples of Myanmar to end military dictatorship once and for all.
N
General N'Ban La
KIO (Kachin Independence Organisation) Chairman; KIA supreme commander; key NUG ally
eao
The KIA has always defended the Kachin people against military aggression. We will continue to fight until a genuine federal union is established.
L
Lway Yay Mong (Tarng Shawng)
TNLA (Ta'ang National Liberation Army) Chairman; Three Brotherhood Alliance co-founder; Operation 1027 architect
eao
Operation 1027 proved that united ethnic armed forces can decisively defeat the junta's military machine. We will not stop until all Myanmar people are free.
P
Peng Daxun
MNDAA (Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army) Chairman; Kokang leader; Operation 1027 co-commander
eao
We launched Operation 1027 to restore Kokang's dignity and autonomy, and to liberate northern Shan State from military occupation. We did not expect such a complete victory so quickly.
K
Saw Kyaw Hla / KNDF
Karenni Nationalities Defence Force (KNDF) Commander; Kayah State resistance leader
eao
Karenni people have suffered genocidal violence for too long. We fight to defend our homes, our culture, and to build a Karenni State where we live on our own terms.
T
Tom Andrews
UN Special Rapporteur on Myanmar Human Rights (2020–2025); called for arms embargo and ICC referral
intl
Myanmar is in a death spiral. The military junta is committing atrocity crimes on a massive scale. The international community must act before it is too late.
W
Wang Yi
Chinese Foreign Minister; key mediator between SAC and Three Brotherhood Alliance; brokered Jan 2024 ceasefire
intl
China hopes all parties in Myanmar will remain calm and restrained, and resolve disputes through dialogue and consultation within the constitutional and legal framework.
K
Kyaw Min Htike
AAPP (Assistance Association for Political Prisoners) Secretary; documents arrests, torture, and deaths in detention
civil
The junta's prison system is a machine of torture and death. Every day our colleagues are beaten, denied medicine, and disappear into cells from which they never return.
S
Sithu Maung
CRPH (Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw) member; NUG ally; activist MP who fled arrest in 2021
nug
We left behind our families, our homes, everything. But we carry with us the mandate of the people who voted for us, and that mandate is to build a democratic Myanmar.
Y
Ye Myo Hein
PDF Commander-in-Chief; NUG Defense Ministry senior official; leads PDF military coordination
nug
The PDF is not a militia β€” we are a national defense force fighting for every citizen of Myanmar. Our fighters come from every ethnicity, religion, and region of this country.
T
Tun Khin
Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK (BROUK) President; Rohingya genocide survivor and international advocate
civil
The same military that committed genocide against us now fights for its survival. We Rohingya support democracy but we need guarantees of safety, citizenship rights, and accountability for the 2017 genocide before we can return.
A
ASEAN 5-Point Consensus
ASEAN's framework for Myanmar dialogue; largely unimplemented; SAC boycotted multiple summits
intl
ASEAN calls on all parties to exercise utmost restraint and implement the Five Point Consensus. The situation in Myanmar has not improved and represents an ongoing threat to regional stability.
01

Historical Timeline

1941 – Present
MilitaryDiplomaticHumanitarianEconomicActive
The Coup & CDM (Feb–Apr 2021)
Feb 1, 2021
Military Seizes Power β€” Coup d'Γ‰tat
Feb 1, 2021
Aung San Suu Kyi & Win Myint Arrested
Feb 5, 2021
CRPH Formed by Ousted Parliamentarians
Feb 6, 2021
Civil Disobedience Movement Launches Nationwide
Mar 3, 2021
Deadliest Day of Protest Crackdowns β€” 38 Killed
Apr 16, 2021
National Unity Government (NUG) Declared
Armed Resistance Emerges (May–Dec 2021)
May 5, 2021
NUG Declares People's Defence Force (PDF)
Aug 7, 2021
NUG Declares 'People's Defensive War' Against SAC
Jun 2021
Karenni/Kayah State Becomes Major Flashpoint
Mar 2021
Chinland Defence Force Forms in Chin State
Nov 2021
KIA Escalates Operations in Kachin State
Dec 24, 2021
Christmas Eve Massacre β€” 35 Civilians Killed in Hpruso
Escalation Across All Fronts (2022)
Jan 2022
Systematic Village Burning Campaign in Sagaing Region
Apr 11, 2022
Airstrike on Let Yet Kone IDP Camp β€” 60+ Killed
Jul 25, 2022
Junta Executes 4 Political Prisoners β€” First Executions in Decades
Oct 23, 2022
Airstrike on Charity Concert in Sagaing Kills 80+
Aug 2022
SAC Extends State of Emergency for Third Time
Dec 2022
Karenni Forces Capture Major SAC Positions Near Loikaw
Junta Counteroffensives (Jan–Sep 2023)
Jan 2023
SAC Launches Major Ground Operations in Sagaing
Apr 11, 2023
Pazigyi Village Airstrike Kills 170+ at Public Gathering
Mar 2023
KIA Captures Strategic Posts Near Myitkyina
Jun 2023
Karenni Forces Press on Loikaw β€” Capital Partially Surrounded
Sep 2023
SAC Intensifies Airstrikes β€” Record Civilian Casualties
Operation 1027 & Resistance Surge (Oct 2023–Mar 2024)
Oct 27, 2023
Operation 1027 Launched β€” Three Brotherhood Alliance Offensive
Nov 2023
MNDAA Captures Chin Shwe Haw Border Town
Nov 2023
200+ SAC Outposts Fall in First Month of Op 1027
Nov 13, 2023
Arakan Army Launches Rakhine State Offensive
Jan 5, 2024
MNDAA Captures Laukkai β€” Kokang Capital Falls
Jan 12, 2024
China Brokers SAC–Three Brotherhood Alliance Ceasefire
Jan 15, 2024
AA Captures Paletwa Township (Chin State Border)
Territorial Collapse & Conscription (Apr–Dec 2024)
Feb 10, 2024
SAC Announces Mandatory Conscription Law
Apr 11, 2024
KNLA Briefly Captures Myawaddy Border Town
Aug 3, 2024
Lashio Falls to MNDAA/TNLA β€” Northern Shan Capital Lost
Dec 8, 2024
AA Captures Maungdaw β€” Full Bangladesh Border Control
Dec 20, 2024
AA Seizes Ann β€” Western Regional Military Command Falls
Oct 2024
Operation 1027 Phase 2 Resumed Across Multiple Fronts
Earthquake, Elections & Ongoing War (2025)
Mar 28, 2025
7.7-Magnitude Earthquake Devastates Central Myanmar
Apr 2025
SAC Impedes Earthquake Relief β€” Aid Workers Targeted
Jul 31, 2025
SAC Formally Dissolved β€” New Security Commission Formed
Dec 28, 2025
Junta-Organized Elections Held β€” Widely Condemned
Mar 16, 2026
Junta Convenes Parliament β€” Min Aung Hlaing Poised for Presidency
Mar 23, 2026
Arakan Army Launches Major Sittwe Siege β€” Naval Base Stormed
Post-Coup Conflict
Mar 2, 2026
Junta Grants Mass Amnesty to Over 10,000 Prisoners Ahead of Parliament
Mar 8, 2026
Junta Bombs Arakan Army POW Camp β€” 116 Killed in Ann Township
Mar 16, 2026
Junta-Backed Parliament Convenes for First Time Since 2021 Coup
Mar 21, 2026
Junta Airstrikes Hit Five Villages in Nyaunglebin District, Bago Region
Mar 21, 2026
International Experts Call for Global Rejection of Junta's 'Puppet Parliament'
Mar 22, 2026
Junta Jets Strike Ayardaw Township β€” At Least 6 Civilians Killed
Mar 23, 2026
SAC Jet Bombs Myaung Township β€” 4 Killed, 40+ Homes Burned
Mar 23, 2026
Junta Deploys Suicide Drones Against Mone Township β€” Monastery Damaged
Mar 23, 2026
Arakan Army Launches Major Assault on Sittwe Naval Base β€” 30–40 Junta Troops Killed
Mar 24, 2026
Junta Jets Strike Yaw Region β€” Six Fighter Aircraft Drop Eight Bombs
Mar 24, 2026
Analysis: Russian Weapons and 'Meat Assault' Tactics From Ukraine Now Shaping Myanmar War
Mar 24, 2026
AA Launches Concurrent Assaults on Ann and Ngape β€” Coordinated Multi-Front Rakhine Offensive
Mar 24, 2026
PDF Landmine Ambush Kills 2 Junta Soldiers in Minhla Township
Mar 25, 2026
Junta Airstrikes Continue Across Multiple Regions β€” 6 Civilians Injured
Mar 25, 2026
Resistance Forces Fire 11 Rockets at Magway Air Base β€” Strike Hub Targeted
Mar 25, 2026
NUG Representative Meets French Senate β€” Seeks Concrete Support
Mar 26, 2026
Junta Kamikaze Drone Strikes Chinese Scam Compound Near Myawaddy β€” 3 Killed
Mar 26, 2026
UK Imposes Sanctions on Triad Leader Running Myawaddy Scam Compound
Mar 27, 2026
SAC Armed Forces Day: Soe Win Announces Imminent Presidential Selection
Mar 27, 2026
AA Advances Deepen Sittwe Siege β€” Fighters Within 2 km of City Center
Mar 28, 2026
One Year Since Great Sagaing Earthquake β€” M4.2 Aftershock Strikes Near Mandalay
Mar 29, 2026
Junta Conducts Airstrikes in Tanintharyi Region
Mar 29, 2026
AA and Resistance Attack Junta Hilltop Base in Padan Township, Magway
Mar 29, 2026
Junta Troops Shell Civilian Funeral in Kyaukpadaung Township β€” War Crime Documented
Source Tier Classification
Tier 1 β€” Primary/Official
CENTCOM, IDF, White House, IAEA, UN, IRNA, Xinhua official statements
Tier 2 β€” Major Outlet
Reuters, AP, CNN, BBC, Al Jazeera, Xinhua, CGTN, Bloomberg, WaPo, NYT
Tier 3 β€” Institutional
Oxford Economics, CSIS, HRW, HRANA, Hengaw, NetBlocks, ICG, Amnesty
Tier 4 β€” Unverified
Social media, unattributed military claims, unattributed video, diaspora accounts
Multi-Pole Sourcing
Events are sourced from four global media perspectives to surface contrasting narratives
W
Western
White House, CENTCOM, IDF, State Dept, Reuters, AP, BBC, CNN, NYT, WaPo
ME
Middle Eastern
Al Jazeera, IRNA, Press TV, Tehran Times, Al Arabiya, Al Mayadeen, Fars News
E
Eastern
Xinhua, CGTN, Global Times, TASS, Kyodo News, Yonhap
I
International
UN, IAEA, ICRC, HRW, Amnesty, WHO, OPCW, CSIS, ICG