La Cuarta Transformación de AMLO: Reducción Récord de Pobreza, Violencia Récord y Revolución Judicial

The first six months of 2019 were the most violent in Mexico's modern history. AMLO's term recorded ~166,193 homicides — the most violent sexenio in Mexican history. The October 2019 Culiacanazo, where AMLO ordered Ovidio Guzmán released after cartel forces mobilized 700 sicarios, became the defining symbol of state surrender. The homicide impunity rate was 99.1%. Security analyst Alejandro Hope: 'It's just a slogan. There are no abrazos.' Eventually AMLO re-militarized security, extending military law enforcement to 2028.

Homicides declined each year from 2020 to 2024, with 2023 recording 30,523 — a 20% reduction from the 2018 peak (SSPC). The root-causes approach — social transfers, minimum wage hikes, Sembrando Vida rural jobs — addressed criminal recruitment drivers. Sheinbaum's campaign claimed a 51% homicide reduction from 2018 to 2023. Political scientist Lorenzo Meyer: 'The idea is to create incentives so young people will not be recruited by organized crime.' Late-term data showed genuine, if modest, improvement.

The Federal Auditor's Office estimated the cancellation cost 184.55 billion pesos (~$11 billion USD). Construction was 30% complete with $3 billion already spent; completing NAICM would have been cheaper than canceling. IATA called the decision 'extremely disappointing.' The non-binding referendum sampled only 1.07 million voters out of ~90 million eligible — a 1.18% participation rate without INE oversight. The AIFA replacement airport operated at minimal capacity for years and failed to replicate NAIM's planned capacity and connectivity.

NAIM had ballooned from $9B to $13B with documented corruption and irregular contracting. Construction on the soft Texcoco lakebed posed serious engineering challenges and significant subsidence risks. Environmental harm to Texcoco wetlands and 130+ bird species would have been severe. AMLO argued the project exemplified PRI-era corruption. AIFA's final cost (~$4–6.2B) was lower than NAIM's projected completion costs, and the Santa Lucía site required no new land acquisition.

Over 9 million trees were deforested. Construction broke through 100+ caverns and cenotes of the Yucatán aquifer system. The route crosses 33% of Mexico's freshwater reserves. No proper environmental impact assessment was completed before construction began. UN OHCHR stated the indigenous consultation 'did not comply with international human rights standards.' An International Rights of Nature Tribunal found Mexico guilty of ecocide and ethnocide in August 2023. Even Environment Minister Alicia Bárcena acknowledged construction damage to protected areas and cave walls.

FONATUR argues the train created tens of thousands of direct jobs and expanded transportation access to some of Mexico's most marginalized communities across five southern states. The 1,554 km network connects underserved regions of Chiapas, Tabasco, Campeche, Yucatán, and Quintana Roo that lacked modern transit infrastructure. The government implemented a US$17 million environmental compensation fund and replanted trees along the corridor. Tourism revenues are expected to benefit local communities near Chichén Itzá, Tulum, and Palenque.

AMLO made three separate attempts to weaken or overhaul the independent INE electoral authority. The September 2024 judicial reform replaced all ~6,500 federal judges with popularly elected officials — the first country in the world to do so — effectively removing judicial independence. He absorbed civilian functions into the military (ports, airports, construction, law enforcement, customs, immigration). He cut budgets of 100+ autonomous regulatory agencies. CSIS, CFR, Wilson Center, and Foreign Policy all classify the period as democratic backsliding via executive aggrandizement. The Economist downgraded Mexico from 'flawed democracy' to 'hybrid regime.'

AMLO argued prior 'autonomous' institutions were captured by technocratic elites and transnational corporations, not genuinely serving citizens. He had clear popular mandates (53% in 2018; Morena supermajority in 2024) and respected term limits by not seeking re-election. He held daily open press conferences (unprecedented in Mexico) framed as maximum transparency. Popular election of judges is practiced in some US states and could be viewed as an extension of direct democracy. His 2018 austerity actually reduced state bureaucracy overhead.

Mexico had the lowest per-capita testing rate in the Americas (17 tests/1,000). Economic stimulus was under 1% of GDP vs. Chile/Brazil/Argentina at 8–10%. AMLO rarely wore a mask publicly, displayed religious 'amulets' as protection, and called his second infection 'Covidcito.' López-Gatell took a beach vacation at peak transmission while urging others to stay home. Excess mortality estimates reached 455,000–655,000 by end of 2021 — far above official counts. Nine governors demanded López-Gatell's resignation. Mexico had the world's third-highest COVID death toll in absolute terms.

Mexico was among the first Latin American countries to begin COVID vaccination (Christmas Eve 2020), securing contracts covering 129% of the population. Avoiding strict lockdowns may have mitigated economic collapse for Mexico's massive informal economy — over 55% of workers who cannot work from home. AMLO argued Mexico ranked 6th in Latin America per-capita COVID deaths — behind Peru, Brazil, Colombia, Argentina, and Paraguay. The sentinel testing model had epidemiological precedent from Mexico's 2009 swine flu response, which AMLO cited as justification.

Poverty fell from 41.9% (2018) to 29.6% (2024) — the lowest in Mexican recorded history — with 13.4 million fewer people in poverty. Extreme poverty fell to 5.3% from 7.0%. The World Bank acknowledged 9.5 million lifted from poverty. Minimum wage hikes, Pensión para Adultos Mayores, Jóvenes Construyendo el Futuro, and Sembrando Vida together contributed to the historic result. Economist Viri Ríos: 'There has never been a single six-year term in which poverty has been reduced so significantly.'

70–73% of poverty reduction was due to minimum wage hikes, not the social programs themselves. The bottom 10% of earners saw cash transfers fall 42% in real terms in 2018–2020 as the new universal system was less targeted. Access to health services collapsed: people without health access rose from 20.1 million (2018) to 44+ million (2022). Former CONEVAL head Gonzalo Hernández Licona: 'We lost focus and lost the ability to give to the poorest.' CONEVAL itself was dissolved and transferred to INEGI in 2024, raising accountability concerns.

The Culiacanazo (Oct 2019): AMLO ordered Ovidio Guzmán released after 700 cartel sicarios mobilized, setting a precedent of state capitulation. Ovidio Guzmán's 2024 US plea deal admitted systematic bribery of Mexican government officials at multiple levels during the AMLO era. Sinaloa Cartel fentanyl operations expanded dramatically 2018–2024. Guacamaya Leaks revealed AMLO's Interior Secretary's hand-picked Tabasco security chief had CJNG ties. The 'abrazos no balazos' framework provided tactical space for cartel consolidation.

AMLO and his government consistently denied collusion. The 2019 Culiacanazo release was framed as avoiding mass civilian casualties — a military tactical judgment AMLO stood behind publicly. AMLO ultimately ordered Ovidio Guzmán re-captured in January 2023 and extradited to the US in September 2023. No direct evidence of personal financial ties between AMLO and cartel leadership has been proven in court. Mexico's cartel violence predates and postdates AMLO; structural conditions — poverty, impunity, demand in the US — are root causes no single policy could quickly resolve.

The UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges expressed serious concern. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and US and Canadian ambassadors all formally objected. Critics argue electing judges makes courts responsive to political popularity rather than law, eliminating the judiciary's ability to check the executive. The reform passed in 8 days with no public deliberation, then was ratified by state legislatures in under 24 hours. Eight of eleven Supreme Court justices resigned in protest — unprecedented in Mexican history. Legal scholars widely describe it as constitutionally regressive.

The reform followed the constitutionally required process: two-thirds of Congress plus ratification by a majority of Mexico's 32 state legislatures. Morena had a genuine supermajority mandate from the June 2024 election (Sheinbaum won 59%). Popular election of judges is practiced in some US states and is not inherently anti-democratic. AMLO argued the judiciary was corrupt and politically biased, citing the many amparos that blocked his infrastructure projects. Democratizing the judiciary could be viewed as direct citizen empowerment rather than institutional capture.

At least 37–41 journalists were killed under AMLO (2018–2024). Article 19 documented 3,400+ aggressions against press. AMLO personally named and attacked journalists at mañaneras, displaying the phone number of NYT correspondent at least once. Pegasus spyware was used against at least 3 journalists during his term. RSF ranked Mexico the deadliest non-conflict country for press throughout his term. OHCHR documented 158 judicial cases filed against journalists, two-thirds linked to public officials. 31 journalists had disappeared in Mexico as of April 2024.

AMLO held 1,833 daily press conferences — an unprecedented level of access to the president. He argued violence against journalists was pre-existing and rooted in cartel power in states controlled by PRI or PAN. He did not order journalist killings. Government-sponsored impunity for cartel violence is a structural problem dating to the 1980s; AMLO did not invent it. The Committee to Protect Journalists also documented journalist killings under predecessor presidents Calderón and Peña Nieto at comparable rates.

AMLO made three separate attempts to reshape the INE electoral authority. He bypassed legislature with dubious non-binding referendums for major infrastructure decisions. He oversaw military absorption of civilian functions: ports, airports, public works, customs, immigration, and domestic security. He appointed a political ally to the Supreme Court — an unprecedented move in Mexican history. He dismantled 100+ autonomous regulatory agencies and trust funds. CFR, CSIS, Foreign Policy, and the Economist all characterized his presidency as executive aggrandizement that exceeded constitutional norms.

AMLO won the 2018 election with 53% of the vote — the largest margin in Mexican history. Morena won a constitutional supermajority in both chambers in 2024 with genuine popular support. He respected term limits and did not seek re-election. His austerity policies actually reduced the size of the federal bureaucracy and government overhead. Supporters frame the 4T as transferring power from entrenched oligarchs and PRI-era technocrats to ordinary citizens. Prior 'autonomous' institutions were themselves non-democratic elite capture mechanisms, some argue.

AMLO injected over $60 billion in government support to Pemex over six years — direct capital, tax cuts, and deferrals — yet Pemex remained the world's most indebted oil company. Production hit a 24-year low in Q1 2024 at 1.542 million bbl/day. Moody's rated Pemex B3 (deep junk). $11 billion in maturities were due in 2024 alone. JPMorgan called each rescue 'a one-off liquidity boost.' Baker Institute: 'AMLO's energy policies will make Mexico poor again.' Every dollar injected into Pemex was unavailable for social programs, health, or education.

Pemex is not merely a company but an instrument of national sovereignty. The $60B in support preserved hundreds of thousands of jobs and maintained Mexico's oil production as partial coverage for government revenues. By 2023, Pemex posted its second consecutive year of net profit (~$6.4B). AMLO argued that private sector involvement in Mexican oil had led to corruption and asset stripping under Peña Nieto's energy reform. State control of energy resources is a fundamental principle in Mexico's constitution.

The minimum wage rose 182% over the sexenio (88.36 → 248.93 pesos/day), the largest sustained increase of any OECD country 2020–2023. An estimated 6.64 million people were lifted out of poverty solely by the wage hikes. Real formal wage growth averaged 2–3% annually across sectors. Low unemployment (2.48% by October 2024, a historic low) during the period suggests the labor market absorbed the increases without the disemployment effects critics predicted. The minimum wage hike was the single largest driver of poverty reduction in the sexenio.

Mexico's inflation peaked at 8.7% (a 20-year high) in August 2022, partly driven by rising labor costs across the supply chain. Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) — which employ 72% of Mexico's workforce — reported significantly higher cost burdens. The business sector (Coparmex, CCE) cited the rapid increases as unsustainable and as discouraging formal job creation. The Northern Border Zone wage (375 pesos/day) created a wage cliff that deterred investment in non-border regions. Some argue the wage increases benefited formal workers while exacerbating informality.

The nearshoring boom was driven primarily by US-China trade tensions and pandemic supply chain disruptions — external factors unrelated to AMLO's governance. Mexico's energy policy (CFE dispatch reform, blocked renewables, USMCA dispute) made manufacturing more expensive and unreliable for energy-intensive industries. Legal uncertainty from AMLO's frequent regulatory reversals discouraged some investors. Critics argue Mexico captured only a fraction of its nearshoring potential precisely because of AMLO's hostile investment climate in key sectors. Private investment as a share of GDP declined under AMLO.

Mexico's macroeconomic stability under AMLO — low public debt (53% GDP), peso strength, low unemployment, USMCA ratification (2020) — provided the foundation that made nearshoring attractive. The minimum wage increased purchasing power without triggering devaluation. AMLO's government negotiated the USMCA ratification in 2020, which reinforced investor confidence in Mexico's rule-of-law framework relative to other emerging markets. Mexico became the US's top trading partner in 2023, a testament to the integration AMLO preserved despite nationalist rhetoric.

Mexico suspended electricity auctions that had attracted record-low renewable energy prices in 2016–2018. No new private renewable projects received permits after 2019. The Baker Institute estimated Mexico missed $150 billion in renewable investment. The USMCA dispute launched by the US and Canada in June 2022 found Mexico's policies discriminatory against foreign renewable investors. Mexico fell far behind regional peers (Chile, Brazil, Colombia) in renewable energy capacity additions. CFE's aging thermal plants emitted more CO2 per kWh than the private renewable projects they replaced in dispatch priority.

AMLO argued the 2013 energy reform allowed private companies to drain Mexican resources at below-market rates by contractually fixing preferential dispatch terms. CFE's financial viability required dispatch priority to amortize its existing plant infrastructure. Manuel Bartlett argued that renewable energy auctions were structured to benefit foreign companies at the expense of Mexican consumers. The lithium nationalization (April 2022) secured a strategic resource for future domestic clean energy development. Maintaining CFE's financial health is a prerequisite for any long-term energy transition.

The dismantling of Seguro Popular and its replacement with the underfunded IMSS-Bienestar model collapsed health coverage: people without access to health services rose from 20.1 million (2018) to 44+ million (2022) — CONEVAL data. Hospital budgets, medical equipment, and staffing were cut under the austerity framework. Medicine shortages became a crisis in 2019–2020, with chemotherapy drugs running out at children's cancer wards. NGO 'Cero Desabasto' documented over 400 types of essential medicines unavailable at IMSS facilities. The COVID pandemic hit a weakened health system particularly hard.

AMLO argued Seguro Popular was riddled with corruption, with funds diverted to contractors and political allies. IMSS-Bienestar provides direct universal health access without intermediaries. Budget realignment toward social programs (pensions, scholarships, rural programs) reduced inequality of resource distribution. The Farmacia del Bienestar network was expanded to 22,000+ locations to provide free medicines. By 2024, the government claimed health coverage gaps were closing. The medicine shortages were in part a deliberate disruption of corrupt supply chains, not just a resource problem.

The 4T produced the largest reduction in poverty in Mexican history (13.4 million lifted out), the largest minimum wage increase in the OECD, record remittance flows, and historically high final approval ratings (68%). The shift of federal spending priorities from infrastructure (roads, NAIM) to direct social transfers was a genuine policy transformation. The 2024 judicial reform, regardless of its merits, fundamentally restructured Mexico's justice system. The 2024 election of Mexico's first female president under a continuation government represents a historic political moment.

Mexico's GDP per capita was 1.5% lower at the end of AMLO's term than at the start — no economic transformation occurred. Key metrics of democracy (Freedom House, Economist Democracy Index, V-Dem) declined. Mexico's homicide rate was higher at the end of the sexenio than at the start in 2018. The military — far from being depoliticized — gained unprecedented influence in civilian life. Health coverage collapsed. Critics (CSIS, CFR, CIDE) describe the 4T as an authoritarian populist project, not a genuine left-wing transformation, noting AMLO's alliance with the military, hostility to civil society, and dismantling of autonomous institutions.

AMLO's three electoral reform attempts (Plan A constitutional — 2021 failed, Plan B statutory — 2022–2023 struck down, Plan C popular vote of judges — 2024 passed) represented a sustained multi-year effort to reshape institutions that certified electoral results. Plan B cut INE's budget by 3.5 billion pesos and reduced staff just before the 2024 election. SCJN struck down Plan B 9–2 on procedural grounds. Millions marched in defense of the INE in 2022–2023 — the largest opposition mobilization of the sexenio. US, EU, and OAS observers expressed concern.

The INE's annual budget exceeded 10 billion pesos — one of the most expensive electoral agencies per voter in the world. AMLO proposed making INE councilors democratically elected rather than appointed by Congress through horse-trading among parties. He argued the INE was controlled by the political class he was elected to replace. Mexico's 2024 election, administered under the unreformed INE framework, was judged by international observers as free and fair — suggesting AMLO's reforms were defeated before they could threaten the 2024 vote. The INE's refusal to implement a popular vote for its councilors could itself be seen as anti-democratic.

Under AMLO, SEDENA (the Army) took over: construction and operation of AIFA airport, Tren Maya sections, the Dos Bocas refinery, port administration, customs enforcement, immigration control, National Guard command, and domestic law enforcement. Military spending as a share of the budget grew significantly. Congress extended military law enforcement authority to 2028. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights warned that entrenching military roles in civilian law enforcement was incompatible with human rights norms. CSIS described the result as a 'praetorian state' in the making.

Mexico's civilian institutions — particularly the Federal Police and public works agencies — were riddled with corruption. AMLO argued that only the military had the organizational discipline and institutional integrity to execute large infrastructure projects without theft. The National Guard, though military-trained, operates under a nominally civilian chain of command. The military's track record in infrastructure delivery (AIFA built in 886 days) demonstrated effectiveness that civilian agencies historically lacked. AMLO's military subordination differs from Latin American cases where militaries acted autonomously of elected government.

AMLO publicly stated fentanyl was purely a US social problem and denied Mexican cartels synthesized the drug — a position US and DEA officials explicitly contradicted with evidence. Sinaloa Cartel and CJNG import precursor chemicals from China, synthesize fentanyl in Mexico, and traffic it north — a fact established through prosecution evidence and Ovidio Guzmán's 2024 plea deal. AMLO's denial made it politically impossible to cooperate on precursor chemical interdiction and lab raids. US-Mexico counternarcotics cooperation reached its lowest ebb since the 1985 DEA Agent Camarena case.

AMLO argued, with some validity, that without US domestic demand for fentanyl, Mexican trafficking would not exist. Over 70,000 Americans die annually from synthetic opioid overdoses — a domestic public health and regulatory failure. AMLO contended that US pressure to militarize Mexican interdiction would reprise the failures of the Calderón drug war (2006–2012), which produced record violence without reducing drug flows. Mexico extradited Ovidio Guzmán to the US (September 2023) and cooperated on specific high-value targets despite AMLO's public rhetoric maintaining sovereignty over law enforcement strategy.

Cases documented where enrollees cleared standing forest to qualify for replanting payments, producing net deforestation rather than reforestation. No comprehensive independent program-wide evaluation was released. Beneficiary savings pool mismanagement and delays in investigating irregularities were documented. Despite claims of 100% environmental practice adoption, satellite forest cover analysis showed no net improvement in program areas in some states. The government expanded the program internationally to El Salvador and Honduras with unverified claims of 96%+ reduction in migration intent among participants.

By 2022, Sembrando Vida had reached over 442,000 beneficiaries across 20 states at ~$250/month per family. 62.3% of beneficiaries reported increased agricultural income. Coffee production among participants increased 25%; cocoa production rose 20%. Budget grew from 15 billion pesos (2019) to ~30 billion pesos (2022–2023), reflecting scale-up. World Bank recognized the program as an innovative model. At-scale agroforestry income helps prevent rural-to-urban migration and cartel recruitment. The triple benefit structure (income + food security + reforestation) was internationally recognized as a promising anti-poverty model.

The Olmeca refinery ballooned from an $8 billion budget to over $20 billion — a 150%+ cost overrun. It was operating at only 17% of nameplate capacity as of December 2024, years after its nominal 2022 'completion.' Building over a mangrove swamp in Tabasco created ongoing structural engineering problems. No private oil company would have financed the project on its economics; Pemex — already the world's most indebted oil company — was forced to absorb the overruns. IMCO gave the project a 2% probability of success when announced. The capital could have funded 8+ years of the entire Tren Maya or hospital construction nationwide.

Mexico historically exported crude oil and imported refined gasoline — paying foreign refineries to process Mexican oil. AMLO argued this was an absurd arrangement that exported value-added jobs. At full capacity, the refinery would reduce Mexico's $20B+ annual gasoline import bill by approximately $6–8B. Refinery ownership provides energy security against geopolitical supply disruptions. The delay and cost overruns were partly attributable to COVID-era supply chain disruptions and construction learning curve for new project type. Long-term, a functional domestic refinery aligns with Mexico's energy sovereignty principles enshrined in its constitution.

Releasing a federally indicted drug lord under cartel military pressure set a dangerous precedent: organized crime could now effectively veto government law enforcement actions. Mexico had extradition requests from the US for Ovidio; releasing him damaged the bilateral relationship. The lesson the cartels drew was that sufficient force would deter state action. Former security official Alejandro Hope called it 'the worst decision in Mexican security policy in a decade.' The precedent may have contributed to the scale of January 2023 cartel retaliation after AMLO's government finally re-captured Ovidio.

AMLO's military commanders were outgunned: the 35-officer convoy faced 700+ gunmen with .50 caliber weapons, armored vehicles, and rocket launchers. Fighting to the end would have resulted in mass civilian casualties in a densely populated city of 860,000. AMLO stated clearly: 'The lives of soldiers and civilians are worth more than one arrest.' Ultimately AMLO did re-capture Ovidio in January 2023 under better-prepared circumstances, with military helicopter escort and immediate transfer to El Altiplano. The 2023 capture and 2024 extradition demonstrated the release was tactical, not a policy surrender.

Opposition parties and INE documented systematic use of social program (Bienestar) delivery events and Banco del Bienestar debit cards as electoral mobilization tools. AMLO regularly promoted Morena and Sheinbaum at mañaneras — a constitutional violation of presidential electoral neutrality. The INE fined Morena multiple times for campaign finance irregularities. Marko Cortés (PAN): 'The election was not clean nor legitimate — it was never a level playing field.' The federal budget expanded by 25% in real terms in 2024 — an election year — with much of the increase flowing to social programs in competitive districts.

International observers (OAS, EU, UN) certified the June 2024 election as technically credible. Sheinbaum won 59% of the vote — representing genuine popular approval of the 4T. Incumbents who deliver real improvements in living standards should expect electoral advantages; this is democracy working correctly. The social program delivery infrastructure predated the election cycle. Xóchitl Gálvez ran a well-funded campaign with media support from Grupo Reforma, Televisa/Univisión, and other pro-opposition outlets. The opposition's defeat reflected popular rejection of their policy platform, not solely manipulation.

AMLO's brother Pío López Obrador was filmed receiving cash-in-bags from a Chiapas businessman in 2020; AMLO defended him without consequence. The Casa Gris scandal — AMLO's son living in a Baker Hughes executive's home while Pemex paid Baker Hughes $151M — suggested influence-peddling at the presidential family level. Guacamaya Leaks revealed military corruption under AMLO's military allies. Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index for Mexico moved from 29 in 2018 to 31 in 2023 — a negligible improvement for a stated anti-corruption presidency. Large-scale procurement was centralized to the Army (SEDENA) without public tender in many projects.

AMLO eliminated the Presidential General Staff, a notorious corruption hub. He refused government contracts for family members and published his assets publicly annually. The Austerity Law banned revolving door hiring and created pay limits that reduced corruption incentives at senior levels. Public procurement for social programs was redesigned to go directly to beneficiaries via Banco del Bienestar accounts, bypassing intermediary contractors. AMLO refused traditional kickbacks from business groups that had characterized prior administrations (PRI-era 'moches'). Independent surveys showed public perception of presidential-level corruption declined significantly.

Mexico registered 4,892 femicides during AMLO's sexenio (SESNSP). AMLO repeatedly dismissed women's rights marches as 'provocations' organized by conservatives and 'pseudo-feminists.' His government's initial COVID response eliminated funding for women's shelters, and he refused to declare a gender emergency despite 11 femicides per day in some months. At a March 8, 2020 Women's Day march, protestors spray-painted the National Palace — AMLO called it vandalism rather than engaging with demands. Human Rights Watch documented systematic failure to investigate or prosecute femicides throughout the sexenio.

AMLO argued that the best protection against gender violence is economic empowerment: his minimum wage increases, Pensión para Adultos Mayores, and Becas Benito Juárez programs disproportionately benefited women. The government eventually invested in expanding the CAVI and UIAEM victim assistance centers and domestic violence shelters after initial budget cuts. Claudia Sheinbaum — the first female president — rose under the 4T and has pledged to prioritize gender violence prevention. AMLO appointed women to key cabinet and judicial positions at higher rates than most predecessors.

CONEVAL (National Council for Evaluation of Social Development Policy) was dissolved in 2024 and its functions transferred to INEGI — an agency within the executive branch. CONEVAL had been one of Mexico's most respected autonomous institutions, with its multidimensional poverty methodology recognized internationally. Critics argued the dissolution was timed to prevent CONEVAL from independently evaluating AMLO's social programs ahead of the 2024 election. Former CONEVAL head Gonzalo Hernández Licona warned that absorbing evaluation into INEGI would compromise independence and comparability of historical data.

AMLO argued that reducing duplicative autonomous agencies would save public resources and streamline government. INEGI is a well-established statistical agency with international recognition. The poverty methodology itself was maintained, and INEGI committed to continuity of the multidimensional measurement framework. The 2024 poverty data showing 29.6% — released under the new structure — was broadly accepted as methodologically consistent with prior CONEVAL measurements. Multiple autonomous agencies were consolidated during the sexenio as part of the broader austerity framework.